Abstract. Using EasyCrypt, we formalize a new modular security proof for one-round authenticated key exchange protocols in the random oracle model. Our proof improves earlier work by Kudla and Paterson (ASIACRYPT 2005) in three significant ways: we consider a stronger adversary model, we provide support tailored to protocols that utilize the Naxos trick, and we support proofs under the Computational DH assumption not relying on Gap oracles. Furthermore, our modular proof can be used to obtain concrete security proofs for protocols with or without adversarial key registration. We use this support to investigate, still using EasyCrypt, the connection between proofs without Gap assumptions and adversarial key registration. For the case of honestly generated keys, we obtain the first proofs of the Naxos and Nets protocols under the Computational DH assumption. For the case of adversarial key registration, we obtain machine-checked and modular variants of the well-known proofs for Naxos, Nets, and Naxos + .
Introduction
Cryptographic protocols, like TLS, SSH, and VPNs, are one of the main building blocks of the Internet. At the heart of these protocols lies a key exchange protocol, which allows two parties to establish a shared session key used for building a secure channel. Traditionally, key exchange has often been realized using key transport protocols. Here, one participant generates the session key and uses public key encryption and signatures to transport it to the peer. Since this approach usually uses a longterm public key for encryption, it lacks resilience against leakage of the corresponding secret key, either through cryptanalysis or coercion. Concretely, if an adversary obtains the longterm secrets of a participant, he can obtain all his session keys. Resilience against such attacks is called forward secrecy [24] . While long known in the cryptographic community, forward secrecy has recently come under public light following revelations about mass surveillance and implementation bugs such as Heartbleed. As a consequence, we expect that the ongoing shift from key transport protocols to key agreement protocols that achieve forward secrecy will accelerate; for instance, there is consensus to deprecate RSA key transport in TLS 1.3.
One solution to achieve forward secrecy is to use protocols that use an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange. Since the ephemeral DH exchange uses fresh exponents for each session, protocols using them can provide forward secrecy. In order to provide authentication, most popular protocols such as TLS and SSH sign the exchanged DH messages. Theoretically, key agreement protocols based on signed DH are well understood and allow for relatively straightforward proofs of the classical security properties and forward secrecy [10, 18] . In practice, their usage in real-world protocols poses additional problems and there is a large body of work on analyzing the security of the combined channel establishment protocol [27, 32, 13] .
Nevertheless, the use of signatures has several disadvantages. First, standardization and implementation must include a signature scheme which might not be required otherwise. Second, the use of signatures might compromise deniability [30] . Third, signing and verification time might be a bottleneck. Furthermore, several realistic attacks are still possible for one-round versions of such protocols. For example, leakage of session randomness can lead to the compromise of future sessions in signed DH protocols [31, Section 1.6] .
To address these deficiencies, implicitly authenticated key exchange (IAKE) protocols have been introduced in [40] . Such protocols enhance an ephemeral DH exchange with static DH keys that are only used in the key computation. Many protocols of this type have been proposed, such as HQMV [31] , Naxos [36] , and Nets [38] , and they often surpass signature-based protocols in terms of performance and security. For example, the HMQV protocol, which is a hashed variant of the MQV [37] protocol, adds authentication to the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman protocol at a very low cost if Shamir's trick [25] is used for multi-exponentiation. Prominent instances of deployed systems based on such protocols include the EMV [17] chip based payment system, which uses a custom protocol and Blackberry phones, which use the elliptic curve version of MQV [37] . One of the main adversary models for IAKE protocols is the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model [36] , which provides very strong security guarantees such as (weak) perfect forward secrecy and session key secrecy even in the case where the session's randomness is leaked.
However, a number of concerns with the provable security of this class of protocols remain. First, only some of them achieve efficient designs and tight reductions under standard assumptions such as computational DH (CDH). Instead, known proofs of efficient protocols often use the Forking Lemma (and therefore give non-tight reductions), or strong assumptions such as Gap-CDH [43] . Second, and probably more importantly, the security definitions for key exchange protocols are an order of magnitude more complex than standard definitions for most cryptographic primitives, such as IND-CCA. This results in long proofs that few people understand or check for flaws. Unsurprisingly, numerous attacks have been discovered on key exchange protocols [28, 31, 41, 42] , even on those claimed provably secure. This second problem is not exclusive to key exchange protocols. In fact, two approaches have been developed to tame the complexity of cryptographic proofs in the computational model.
The first approach is to develop generic results that can be applied to many concrete instances. While genericity does not eliminate the possibility of flaws, it allows to build a reduced corpus of results on which the security of protocols depends, and gives greater incentive to examine their proofs carefully. One popular class of generic results in cryptography are protocol transformations. If a protocol Π is secure with respect to an adversary model M, then Π can be transformed into a (more complicated) protocol Π that is secure with respect to a stronger adversary model M . For key exchange, this approach was pioneered by Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk [8] and other transformations have been proposed by Kudla and Paterson [33] , Cremers and Feltz [23] , and Boyd et al. [16] . However, existing transformations have several drawbacks, in particular: the transformation in [8] cannot be applied to many protocols of interest; the transformations in [23, 16] assume that the initial protocol is already secure in the eCK model; and the transformation in [33] only supports proofs under Gap assumptions, predates the eCK model and is only applicable to weaker security models.
The second approach is to build machine-checked, independently verifiable proofs of security; this approach has been suggested notably by Halevi [26] , and more recently by Hales 4 in the context of verifying the absence of trapdoors in NIST standards. Assuming that the verification tool is correct, one can gain trust in a formal proof simply by checking the definitions it uses and the theorem statement, since the tool ensures the correctness of the reasoning steps. There are two mature tools to perform machine-checked cryptographic proofs in the computational model: CryptoVerif [14] and EasyCrypt [6, 5] . CryptoVerif is an automatic prover in the computational model and has been applied to cryptographic constructions such as the Full Domain Hash signature scheme, Kerberos, and the One-Encryption Key Exchange. EasyCrypt is a toolset for the construction and verification of game-based cryptographic proofs and has mostly been applied to cryptographic primitives, such as the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, and the OAEP padding scheme. So far neither of these tools have been used to obtain machine-checked proofs of modern key exchange protocols with respect to their intended security definitions.
Both approaches are complementary. Indeed, machine-checked proofs make checking proofs efficient, but they also significantly increase the cost of building proofs. As a consequence, generic results are ideal targets for machine-checked proofs, for two reasons. First, the cost of building proofs for generic results is justified by their multiple applications. Second, the level of abstraction required to obtain generic proofs combined with the explicit tracking of assumptions in machine-checked proofs often provides new insights.
Contributions
We develop a new generic proof of security for key-exchange protocols, and instantiate it to obtain security proofs for known protocols with respect to different adversary models and hardness assumptions. In the cases of Naxos and Nets, we show that it is possible to obtain a CDH proof (without GAP) if static keys are honestly generated. We also formalize our generic proof and its instantiations using EasyCrypt. We elaborate on these points below.
Generic Proof for eCK security. We consider the class of one-round Diffie-Hellman protocols defined in the random oracle model where the session key is the output of a hash function. We reduce eCK-security of a key exchange protocol in this class to a condition on the key computation function and four simple games, in which the adversary can access at most one oracle. For protocols that employ the Naxos trick and use h(x, a) as the exponent of the DH message, we provide an even simpler reduction with three games.
Concretely, we structure our generic proof in terms of protocol transformations and different versions of the security game. We are interested in eCK security. As proof tools, we also use three additional security games:
eCK: Adversary must distinguish the session key of a fresh test session from random key. eCK nt : Variant of eCK where adversary must provide the actor's static secret key as input to the ephemeral reveal oracle. CSK: Simplified game for protocols that do not use the Naxos trick where adversary must compute session key of test session (4 cases). CSK nt : Simplified game for protocols that use the Naxos trick where adversary must compute session key of test session (3 cases).
We then define protocol transformations T nt (use Naxos trick) and T hsk (hash session key) and prove that the following implications hold for all protocols Π:
As an example, consider the Naxos protocol which uses the Naxos trick and hashes its session key. We first define the "core" of Naxos and call it Naxos core . Since it holds that Naxos = T hsk (T nt (Naxos core )), it suffices to prove that Naxos core is CSK nt -secure to obtain that Naxos is eCK-secure. While the original eCK security definition consists of a game with seven oracles where the winning condition contains a complicated freshness condition, the CSK nt game has a very simple winning condition and only provides a decision oracle that allows the adversary to confirm session key guesses.
To compare different models of key distribution, we support two versions of the eCK model: The eCK nkr model where all static keys are honestly generated and the eCK kr model that allows the adversary to adaptively register arbitrary public keys for dishonest parties without providing a proof of possession. The original eCK model [36] sits in between our two versions. The adversary can register arbitrary public keys for dishonest parties before activating the first session, i.e., the registered public keys can depend on public keys of honest parties, but not on protocol messages, as, for example, required for Kaliski's attack [28] on MQV.
Our proof improves [33] in several ways: it uses the stronger eCK adversary model (with and without adversarial key registration); it supports proofs under standard assumptions (whereas the proof from [33] requires Gap assumptions), and; it exploits the Naxos trick resulting in simpler proof obligations for protocols that use it.
Concrete Proofs. We instantiate the generic proof to obtain security proofs for existing protocols; in all cases, the proofs of the simplified games are short by the standards of machine-checked proofs. Our results are summarized in Figure 1 . Concretely, we prove that:
-Naxos and Nets are secure in the eCK model under the CDH assumption if keys are honestly generated. If we allow arbitrary adversarial key registration, we require the Gap-CDH assumption as in the original proof. -The Naxos variant Naxos + [39] is secure in the eCK model with arbitrary adversarial key registration under the CDH assumption. Here we obtain a similar result to the original proof using our generic proof method. -A version of HMQV is secure in the eCK model under the Gap-CDH assump-
tion. The version we analyze includes the identities and exchanged message in the input of the key derivation hash. The proof does not need KEA1 (knowledge of exponent assumption).
EasyCrypt Formalization. We have formalized all models, our generic proof for protocols using the Naxos trick, and the proofs for Nets, Naxos, and Naxos + in EasyCrypt. Our formalization constitutes the biggest case study developed with the tool so far; e.g. the generic proof for protocols using the Naxos trick takes about 30,000 lines of code, including game definitions (about 50 of them), specifications, and proofs. On the other hand, the instantiation of the proof for concrete protocols is short and takes less than 1,000 lines each. Our formalization also includes several reusable libraries that deal with random oracles, Twin DH, and common proof techniques such as plug and pray, that we discuss in Section 2.3.
Future Work
There are several directions for future work, including:
1. Automation and synthesis. The next logical step of this work is to extend our library of high-level principles to reason about AKE proofs in the random oracle model and provide more automation to simplify their application. These high-level principles will serve as a useful basis for future formalizations in EasyCrypt (beyond AKE), but will also make it faster to extend the current proof to support new features. They could also serve as a basis for fully automated proof methods and allow for the use of synthesis to generate secure protocols, following [3] .
2. Extensions. We plan to strengthen our results in different directions. Possible extensions include adversary models with a more precise model of the CA [16] , adversary models that allow reveal of different parts of state, and models of weak randomness. Moreover, we are also interested in using our framework to analyze larger protocols that use AKE as a subprotocol. This will be valuable to evaluate existing [45] and future proposals for secure transport-layer protocols.
3. Implementations. Our model provides a precise specification of the protocol. Using the techniques from [2] , we intend to carry the security proof to executable implementations.
Related work
There is a vast body of literature on key-exchange protocols and on their associated security models; for a comparison between some existing models we refer to [34, 20, 22] . In addition to Naxos + , which we already mentioned, there are other protocols that achieve eCK-security under the CDH assumption, e.g., by Kim, Fujioka, and Ustaoglu [29] or by Pan and Wang [44] .
There has been extensive work on the formal verification of key exchange protocols, see for instance the recent survey [15] . A significant amount of work is carried in the symbolic model, a high-level model which idealizes the treatment of cryptographic primitives. This level of abstraction makes the symbolic model amenable to automated analysis, and many tools have been developed for proving protocol security. Recent results focusing on DH-based key exchange protocols include [7] , [35] and [46] . Over the last decade, many results on computational soundness results [1, 21] have shown that under certain conditions, protocols deemed secure in the symbolic model remain secure in the computational model. Another related line of research (see, e.g., [12] ) deals with the verification of implementations of security protocols such as TLS in the computational model.
In this section, we give some background on notation, authenticated key exchange protocols, and EasyCrypt.
Notation

A
* denotes the set of all sequences with elements taken from A. For two sequences s 1 and s 2 , we use S 1 + + S 2 to denote their concatenation. We use s 1 ← + + s 2 as a shorthand for the assignment s 1 ← s 1 ++ s 2 . In the special case of bitstrings b 1 and b 2 , we also use b 1 b 2 to denote their concatenation.
We use A B to denote the set of partial functions from
(update f at key a). For a finite set A, we use x $ ← A to denote that x is uniformly sampled from A.
We use G to denote a cyclic group of prime order p with generator g. We use F p to denote the field of integers modulo p. We use dlog(Y ) to denote the discrete logarithm of Y with respect to the basis g. We define dh(X, Y )
Based on the previous definitions, we define the following cryptographic assumptions. The challenger for DLOG gives X $ ← G to the adversary who must return dlog(X). The challenger for CDH gives X, Y $ ← G to the adversary who must return dh(X, Y ). For SCDH, the adversary is given the same challenge, but must return a set containing dh(X, Y ). We also define Gap versions [43] of these assumptions where the adversary is given access to an oracle that returns ddh(X, Y, Z) for arbitrary X, Y, Z ∈ G.
One-Round Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols
In the following, we focus on one-round key exchange protocols. We believe most of our results can be extended to a more general notion of protocol. Further note that our results are not restricted to DH-based protocols and the formal definitions in Section 3.1 will generalize some of the notions we introduce informally in this section. Figure 2 shows the computations and exchanged messages for a typical DHbased key exchange protocol. We assume a protocol consists of three components. First, there is a protocol component for key generation, which we show in the first line. Here, a participantÂ samples the static secret key a and computes the corresponding static public key A. Second, there is a component responsible for the distribution of the static public keys. We ignore the details for now and just assume that an agent can obtain the public key of another agent.
Finally, there is a component responsible for establishing the session key. This component consists of an initiator role and a responder role. If an agent A executes an instance of the initiator (resp. responder) role with the goal of establishing a session key withB, we call this execution a session with role initiator (resp. responder), actorÂ, and peerB.
compute session key
Generic two pass protocol. Protocols using the Naxos trick use boxed messages.
When the initiator role is activated with actorÂ and peerB, it first generates an ephemeral secret key x, computes the ephemeral public key X, sends it toB, and waits for a reply. When the responderB is activated with a received message fromÂ, he stores the received message as X, generates y and Y in the same way as the initiator, sends Y toÂ, and computes the session key using the KeyR function. When the initiator is activated with the received message, he computes the session key using KeyI .
We can define the HMQV protocol by using KeyI /KeyR that compute the key as
de , e =h(X,B), and d =h(Y,Â). We can define the Naxos and Nets protocols by using the boxed expressions from Figure 2 to compute X and Y . These protocols both utilize the Naxos trick which combines the static and the ephemeral secret using the hash function h to obtain the exponent of ephemeral public key. Since the hash output is never stored and recomputed when required, these protocols are analyzed with respect to possible leakage of x or a, but leakage of h(x, a) is not considered. The Naxos protocol defines the session key as
The Naxos + protocol extends the Naxos protocols with the additional group element dh(A, B), i.e., the session key is defined as
Informally, the security notion expected of such protocols is the following. If A completes a session with (honest) peerB, then the session string computed byÂ is indistinguishable from a random bitstring for everyone exceptB. It has been shown by Canetti and Krawczyk [18] that this is sufficient to establish a secure channel betweenÂ andB. The secure channel can then be used for key confirmation. Recent adversary models like eCK build on this definition, but also allow for many scenarios where the adversary learns additional information such as ephemeral secret keys, static secret keys, or session keys. The eCK-model guarantees resilience against Unknown Key Share Attacks, Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience, and Weak Perfect Forward Secrecy, which we discuss at the end of Section 3.1.
EasyCrypt
EasyCrypt [6, 5] is a machine-checked framework for building and verifying security proofs of cryptographic constructions. EasyCrypt follows the code-based, game-based approach to reductionist arguments: a proof consists of a series of probabilistic programs with adversarial code, called games, and of probabilistic claims relating the probability of one or more events in one or more games. However, EasyCrypt adopts a foundational approach, meaning that probabilistic claims, and the overall security statement, must all be justified to the last detail by means of elementary rules. Leveraging the state of the art in program verification, all probabilistic claims are proved using a probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic (pRHL), which generalizes Relational Hoare Logic [11] to a probabilistic setting. pRHL is a program logic whose judgments are of the form
where c 1 and c 2 are games and Φ and Ψ are relations on program states. The rules of pRHL allow to derive valid judgments, where a judgment as above is valid if for every initial memories m 1 and m 2 that are related by Φ, the output sub-distributions obtained by executing c 1 on m 1 and c 2 on m 2 respectively are related by Ψ # , where # is an operator that lifts relations on states to relations on sub-distributions over states. The definition of # is inspired from probabilistic process algebra. For suitable choices of Ψ , this implies inequalities of the form
which are typical in game-based proofs, i.e., the probability of event E 1 after executing c 1 in initial memory m 1 is upper-bounded by the probability of event E 2 after executing c 2 in m 2 .
Although pRHL captures common patterns of reasoning in cryptographic proofs, there is an impedance mismatch between cryptographic practice and proofs built using pRHL; in particular, pRHL lacks mechanisms to instantiate previous results, and to apply high-level principles in proofs. To make matters precise, consider for instance the reduction of SCDH to CDH: using pRHL, one can prove that any instance of SCDH can be reduced to CDH, but one cannot perform the proof once and for all, and reuse the result. Fortunately, EasyCrypt now features a module system; the module system combines the power of module systems, as they exist in functional programming languages, with a system of capabilities that is used to restrict access to oracles or fragments of memories, as required in cryptography. The module system can be used for performing successive reductions locally, as often featured in pen-and-paper proofs. Module systems are essential to formalize complex proofs such as the ones considered here; indeed, previous attempts to carry out the generic proof without the module system were unsuccessful, because the adversary was carried explicitly throughout the proof, making reasoning unwieldy.
Additionally, the module system allows to prove general principles once and for all, and to carry out proofs simply by applying high-level principles. In our formalization underlying this paper, we make extensive use of the following principles:
-lazy and eager sampling: this is used to switch back and forth between an implementation of a random function in which images are sampled on demand (lazily), or during initialization of the game (eagerly); -plug and pray: if some event Φ happens for some 0 ≤ i < n, randomly sample a value j in this range and consider the event Φ ∧ i = j instead of Φ; and -adversary prescience: this is used to provide an upper bound to the probability that an adversary guesses an unused value in the range of a random function
Model and Generic Proof
In this section, we first introduce our generic protocol model and our versions of the eCK model with and without adversarial key registration. Afterwards, we present our generic proof for protocols that employ the Naxos trick.
3.1 eCK kr Security and eCK nkr Security
We assume given a set ID of agent identities. We also define the set Role = {I, R} and the function (·) : Role → Role such that I = R and R = I.
Generic Protocol Model.
A protocol definition consists of instantiations for the types and functions given in the first column of Figure 3 . These types and functions are instantiated as follows: -The sequence H 1 : I 1 → O 1 , . . . , H k : I k → O k defines the types of hash functions used by the protocol. -Sk defines the type of static secret keys, Pk defines the type of static public keys, Esk defines the type of ephemeral secret keys, Epk defines the type of ephemeral public keys, and Key defines the type of session keys. -The function Pk defines how the static public key is computed from the static secret key and the function Epk defines how the ephemeral public key is computed from the ephemeral secret key and the static secret key. -The functions KeyI and KeyR define how the session key is computed from the actor's secret data, the peer's public data, and the participants' identities. We use partial functions to capture failure, e.g., if a subgroup element check fails for one of the arguments. We keep the distributions according to which the static and ephemeral secret keys are sampled implicit and assume they are uniformly sampled unless otherwise stated. The functions Epk , KeyI , and KeyR can use the hash functions H i . See Figure 3 for the Naxos core instantiation of the generic model. In the next section, we will demonstrate how Naxos core can be transformed into Naxos.
Types/Functions
Naxos core Naxos = T hsk (T nt (Naxos core )) Protocol Transformations. We define two transformations T hsk and T nt . The first transformation T hsk modifies a protocol to hash the session key. The second transformation T nt modifies a protocol to utilize the Naxos trick. Figure 3 demonstrates how the Naxos protocol can be obtained by applying the two transformations to Naxos core . We assume T hsk is implicitly parameterized by a positive integer l defining the size of the hash function output.
Given a protocol Π using hash functions H, defining types Sk, Pk, Esk, Epk, Key, and defining functions Pk , Epk , KeyI , KeyR, the transformed protocols T hsk (Π) and T nt (Π) are defined as follows. We obtain T hsk (Π) from Π by adding a hash function H : Key → {0, 1}
l to H, changing the type Key to {0, 1} l , redefining KeyI in terms of the original KeyI as ki → H(KeyI (ki)), and redefining KeyR analogously. We obtain T nt (Π) from Π by adding a hash function h : Esk × Sk → Esk to H and redefining Epk in terms of the original Epk as (x, a) → Epk (h(x, a), a). We also redefine the key computation to use h(x, a) instead of x. Note that the original Epk usually ignores its second input and a is therefore only used as input to h in the computation of the ephemeral public key. We denote the composition of T nt and T hsk with T nt,hsk .
Security Experiments. To define the games eCK kr and eCK nkr (with and without adversarial key registration), we first define the type St for the state of protocol sessions and the type Ev for the events required to express the security definition. We define St as Role × Esk × Epk × ID × ID × Epk ⊥ × Key ⊥ . We define Ev as the data type generated by the constructors
The main procedure of the games eCK kr,Π (A) and eCK nkr,Π (A) is given in the first column of Figure 4 . We assume that the adversary A consists of the two procedures A 1 and A 2 sharing state. In the games, the adversary is provided with access to the oracles defined in the second column of Figure 4 and with random oracle access using wrappers H A 1 , . . . , H A k . The oracles establishHonest and establishDishonest (only in eCK kr,Π ) allow the adversary to establish honest agents for which the keys are sampled and dishonest agents where the public key can be chosen. For honest agents, the adversary can control the execution of initiator and responder sessions using init 1 , init 2 , and resp. Dishonest agents can be used as peers of protocol sessions, but cannot be used as actors since the static secret key is required to execute the protocol. The remaining oracles allow the adversary to reveal static secrets, ephemeral secrets, and session keys.
The adversary wins if he can distinguish the session key of the test session from a random session key and the test session is fresh, i.e., he did not perform forbidden reveal queries. The freshness condition is formalized using the fresh predicate given in Figure 5 . We use the ephemeral public key to identify a session for session key reveals and ephemeral reveals.
Discussion. In eCK kr , we allow the actor of the test session to execute sessions with dishonest users, but the actor and peer of the test session itself must be honest. In both eCK kr and eCK nkr , we disallowÂ =B because many deployed protocols disallow this case or use distinct keys for different roles. It would be possible to lift this limitation at the cost of additional proof obligations for users of the generic proof.
The freshness condition captures Unknown Key Share Attacks because ifÂ establishes a key withB, butB believes that he shares this key withĈ =Â, then there are two non-matching sessions with the same session key and one of them can be revealed. It captures Key Compromise Impersonation because leakage of the actors static secret key is allowed for the test session. It also captures Weak Perfect Forward Secrecy because for all sessions where the adversary is passive (there is a matching session), reveals for all ephemeral secrets, except for those of the test session and its matching session, and for all static secrets are allowed. The stronger notion of Perfect Forward Secrecy requires changes to the freshness condition and we leave such an extension of our results open for future work.
In our definition of Naxos, we use the type G for ephemeral and static public keys. This models an implementation ensuring that these values are elements of G. It is also possible to use a "larger type" and explicitly model the required checks using failure in the key computation functions.
Generic Proof
Before presenting our generic proof, we define three properties of core protocols: Game:
Oracles (eCK nkr does not include establishDishonest): We assume the second property for simplicity. For core protocols, which we consider here, it usually suffices to reorder the key string elements to obtain KeyI (ki) from KeyR(ki). The third property is called strong partnering in [33] and ensures key independence.
Exploiting the Naxos Technique. We exploit that for protocols T nt (Π) using the Naxos technique, both x and a are required to learn the secret input h(x, a) of Epk . This is a consequence of the fact that the value h(x, a) cannot be revealed by the adversary in the eCK model. This decision is motivated by the assumption that honest agents executing the protocol never store the value h(x, a). We can therefore prove security of Π in a restricted eCK nt game to obtain eCK-security of T nt (Π). For m ∈ {kr, nkr}, we obtain eCK There is no session key reveal for t, not both ephemeral and static reveal for t, KeyRev(X) / ∈ evs ∧ ¬(EphRev(X) ∈ evs ∧ StaticRev(Â) ∈ evs) and the adversary did not registerÂ's orB's public keys. ∧ Dishonest(Â) / ∈ evs ∧ Dishonest(B) / ∈ evs If there is a matching session t , then ∧ (Accept(r , Y,B,Â, X) ∈ evs =⇒ there is no key reveal for t and not both ephemeral and static reveal for t . with ephRev nt as defined below:
Informally, our reduction exploits that x for Π in eCK nt corresponds to h(x, a) for T nt (Π) in eCK and a query ephRev nt (i, a) in eCK nt corresponds to the sequence of queries x ← ephRev (i); h A (x, a) in eCK. To state our lemma, we define A to be a (q se , q ag , q H ) eCK m (or eCK nt m ) adversary if A activates at most q se sessions involving at most q ag agents and performs at most q Hi queries to the random oracle H A i . We use q h to denote the number of queries to the random oracle h A introduced by the T nt transformation.
Lemma 1. Let m ∈ {kr, nkr}, Π be a protocol, and A a (q se , q ag , q H ) eCK m adversary. Then there is a (q se , q ag , q H ) eCK nt m adversary B such that
se/2 |Esk|. Furthermore, the adversary B runs in time at most O(q h t Pk + t A ) where t Pk is the time required to compute Pk .
In our EasyCrypt formalization, we explicitly construct the simulator S sketched in the proof below and prove the probability statement for B = S(A).
Proof (Sketch). After bounding the probability of collisions for ephemeral secrets and bounding the probability of the adversary querying h A (x, * ) for an ephemeral secret x before revealing it, we define a simulator B that calls A and handles queries as follows: On queries init 1 and resp, B updates a mapping from the session index i of the started session to the public key A i of i's actor. For queries ephRev (i), B samples and stores the valuex i ensuring that there are no collisions and that answers are consistent, i.e., B simulates the ephemeral secrets in eCK m,T nt (Π) . On query h A (z, c), B checks if there is an i such that z =x i and Pk (c) = A i (which implies a i = c, i.e., c is equal to the static secret key of the i-th session) and returns ephRev nt (i, a i ) if the check succeeds and h(z, c) otherwise. All other queries are just forwarded. In the reduction, the ephemeral secrets
Exploiting the Hashing of the Session Key. The CSK nt nkr and CSK nt kr models for protocols that employ the Naxos technique are defined by the three games given in Figure 6 . The winning conditions state that the adversary must compute certain keys. They result from case distinctions where we show that the adversary cannot win unless he queries these keys to ephRev nt or the random oracle H. We first describe the games and then explain how they are used in the reduction.
The adversary is given a static public key A, a vector Z of ephemeral public keys, and a vector c of static secret keys. To win, he must return the static secret key a for A. He is given access to a decision oracle that returns 1 if the given k is the session key for a session with session data (z i , a, , Y, C,Â,Ĉ) where z i must be an element of z, a is fixed, andÂ,Ĉ, and Y can be arbitrary. For m = kr, C can be arbitrary. For m = nkr, C must be an element of Pk (c) reflecting that keys are honestly generated. G hsk,nt 2,m : The adversary is given an ephemeral public key X, a static public key B, a vector Z of ephemeral public keys, and a vector c of static secret keys. He chooses a static secret key c i from c, an arbitrary ephemeral public key Y , and arbitrary agent identitiesÂ andB. To win, he must return a set S that contains the session key for (x, c i , Y, B,Â,B) . He is provided with access to a decision oracle that returns 1 if the given k is the session key for a session with session data (z j , b, W, C,B,Ĉ) where z j must be an element of z, b is fixed, and W ,B, andĈ can be arbitrary. For m = kr, the static public key C of the peer can be arbitrary. For m = nkr, C must be an element of Pk (c).
The adversary is given ephemeral public keys X, Y and a vector c of static secret keys. He chooses static secret keys c i , c j in c and arbitrarŷ A,B. To win, he must return a set S that contains the session key for (x, c i , Y, Pk (c j ),Â,B).
In the reduction, we use G hsk,nt 1,m to handle the case where the adversary queries ephRev nt (i, a) without revealing the static secret a for someÂ. For the remaining cases, we know that the ephemeral secret x of the test session must be secret. We use G is used forB's sessions. We can now state our main theorem using q h (resp. q H ) to denote the number of queries to the oracle introduced by T nt (resp. T hsk ).
Theorem 1 Let m ∈ {kr, nkr} and Π be a protocol satisfying properties P1-P3. Let A be a (q se , q ag , q H ) eCK m adversary. Then there are CSK
for T nt,hsk = (2 q h qse + 2 q 2 se ) /|Esk|, δ 1 = q ag , δ 2 = q ag q se , and δ 3 = q 2 se . Furthermore, the adversaries B 1 and B 2 perform at most q H q se queries to eqS and the adversaries B 2 and B 3 return sets of size at most 2 q H . The adversaries B 1 -B 3 run in time at most O((q h + q ag ) t Pk + q se t proto + q se q H + t A ) where t proto denotes the time to execute a protocol session.
Proof (Sketch). We first apply Lemma 1. Then it remains to prove that CSK Oracles:
Replace keyRev and h A with eqS . Keep other oracles. Fig. 7 . Intermediate game GI used in reductions (eCK nt to CSK nt and eCK to CSK).
used to compute the session key of the test session. We first bound the probability that the adversary wins without querying σ to H A by 1 /2. First, note that he cannot reveal a session key with hash input σ since condition P3 for Π implies that the corresponding session is either a matching session or the test session itself (up to collisions of ephemeral secrets and guessing of unused ephemeral secrets). He therefore receives a key that is sampled independently of his view for both values of b and cannot do better than guessing b in this case. We now proceed by bounding the probability of σ ∈ Q H ∧ fresh evs (sid) in eCK nt m,T hsk (Π) where sid = (r, X,Â,B, Y ) and Q H is the set of values queried to H by the adversary. Our goal is to perform a reduction to the intermediate game GI m,Π shown in Figure 7 . The simulator will use the eqS oracle in GI m,Π to simulate the oracles H A and keyRev and return (t, Q H ). The eqS oracle is used to synchronize values returned in keyRev and H, but it cannot be used for the call to H for σ in the main body. We therefore perform a sequence of steps that includes enforcing a (monotonous version of) freshness to remove this call before performing the reduction.
To obtain the three games G from GI m,Π , we perform two case distinctions followed by one reduction for each case. The first case distinction is for the event that the adversary queries EphRev(i, a) without performing StaticRev(Â) and revealing a beforehand. To bound this probability, we first guessÂ and then perform a reduction to G hsk,nt 1,m,Π . Since the adversary can reveal all secrets except for a and the ephemeral secret keys ofÂ, the simulator receives the static secret keys c of the other agents, the ephemeral public keys ofÂ's sessions, and A. The simulator samples all other values himself and can simulate all oracles on its own, except for eqS where the provided oracle is used forÂ's sessions. If m = nkr, all keys are honestly generated and for all queries to eqS , the static public key of the peer is equal to Pk (c) for some c ∈ c. If m = kr, the static public key of the peer can be arbitrary.
Before performing the second case distinction, we guess the test session. Since there is no ephemeral reveal without a previous static reveal, the test session's ephemeral secret x cannot be revealed. We now perform a case distinction if the
Game G:
return φ(X, Z, t) Fig. 8 . Twin DDH games G 2DDH and G.
adversary reveals the static secret key b of the peerB of the test session. If not, then we know that x, b, and the ephemeral secret keys ofB's sessions are secret.
To perform the reduction to G hsk,nt 2,m,Π , we guessB and define a simulator that receives X, B, the static secret keys c of all agents exceptB, and the ephemeral public keys ofB's sessions. The simulator samples all other values himself and can simulate all oracles on its own, except for eqS where the provided oracle is used forB's sessions. Like in the previous case, the static public key of the peer is equal to Pk (c) for some c ∈ c if m = nkr and arbitrary otherwise.
In the last case, there is a static reveal for the peerB of the test session. Hence, there must be a matching session with ephemeral secret key y and the only other value that cannot be revealed is x. We guess the matching session and since eqS queries for the test session and the matching session are forbidden, the simulator for G hsk,nt 3,Π can simulate the eqS oracle on its own in this case.
Trapdoor Test, Twin DH, and (S)CDH
To minimize the EasyCrypt proof effort, we first prove a generalized version of the Twin DH Assumption from [19] . We use this result for the protocol proofs and to obtain a tighter reduction from CDH to SCDH based on Shoup's self corrector [47] .
Twin DH. In the original Twin DH assumption, the adversary is given challenges X, Y, Z ∈ G and has to compute the group elements (dh(X, Z), dh(Y, Z)) given oracle access to
The value Y is called the "twin" of X and the assumption can be seen as a "twin version" of the Strong DH assumption, which is a variant of Gap CDH where the first input of the DDH oracle is fixed. In contrast to these two assumptions, Twin DH follows from CDH in all groups since the 2DDH oracle can be simulated using the trapdoor test.
Our generalization uses n twins Y 1 , . . . , Y n of X instead of a single twin and consequently provides a 2DDH oracle that can be used with all twins X, Y i . Concretely, for a predicate φ, we define the two games G 2DDH and G given in Figure 8 and prove the following lemma for which the proof can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. Let A be a G 2DDH adversary that performs at mostueries to 2DDH. Then there exists a G adversary B such that
Moreover, B runs in time O(T A + q t G + n t G ) where t G denotes the time required to perform a group operation such as exponentiation or division.
We define the following reductions as instantiations of this lemma:
An efficient reduction from SCDH to CDH. We have formalized the proof following the approach outlined by Cash et al. in [19] . Note that our proof critically relies on the possibility to relate the probability that an adversary who is called twice wins both times to the probability for a single win. Support for this type of reasoning is a recent extension to EasyCrypt. The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 2 Let A be an SCDH adversary that returns a set of size at most m. Then there exists a CDH adversary B such that
Furthermore, the adversary B runs in time O(T A + m 2 t G ).
Case Studies
We first present the application of our generic proof to the Naxos and Naxos + protocols. Afterwards, we present our proofs for the Nets protocol.
Proofs for Naxos and Naxos
+
We first prove that Naxos is secure in our eCK nkr model with honestly generated keys under the CDH assumption. In the proof, we discuss why it does not generalize to the eCK kr model with adversarial key registration. Afterwards, we describe two ways to obtain a proof in the eCK kr model from the instantiation of our generic proof. First, the proof can be performed with respect to the Gap-CDH assumption. Second, the protocol can be extended with an additional group element in the key yielding the Naxos + protocol [39] which was proved secure under the CDH assumption in a model similar to eCK kr .
eCK nkr -security of Naxos under the CDH assumption. The following theorem states that Naxos is secure in our model without adversarial key registration if the CDH problem is hard.
Theorem 3 Let A be a (q se , q ag , q H ) eCK nkr adversary. Then there exist adversaries C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 such that 2 Pr [eCK nkr,Naxos (A)
where δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , and T nt,hsk are defined as in Theorem 1. Furthermore, C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 run in time at most O(n t G + t A ) where n = max{q h , q ag , q H q se , q
Proof. The definition of Naxos core is given in Figure 3 . It is easy to check that Naxos core satisfies P1-P3 and Naxos = T nt,hsk (Naxos core ). We can therefore apply Theorem 1 to reduce eCK nkr -security of Naxos to CSK nt nkr -security of Naxos core . This step accounts for the loss of T nt,hsk and yields adversaries B 1 -B 3 that return sets of size at most 2 q H and perform at most q H q se queries to eqS . In the next step, we will define C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 and prove that the inequalities 
Since we perform a reduction to DLOG 2DDH in the first step, we have already rewritten eqS such that it does not use a and z. Before continuing, we rename DLOG 2DDH such that X becomes A, Y becomes Z, and Z becomes R. Our DLOG 2DDH adversary C 1 then receives the DLOG-challenge A, the twins Z of A, and the value R which is unused in DLOG. C 1 samples c, calls B 1 with (A, Z, c), and returns B 1 's return value, which is equal to dlog(A) whenever B 1 wins. C 1 uses the following implementation to simulate eqS :
Since the original eqS returns 1 if and only if U 1 = dh(A, Y ) and U 3 = dh(Z i , Y ) (which corresponds to the 2DDH result) and the remaining equalities hold, the simulation is perfect. We can now apply Lemma 2 to obtain a reduction to DLOG for an adversary C 1 .
While this reasoning step is valid in the eCK kr model, it does not work in the eCK kr model since the adversary can register arbitrary static public keys. Hence, the eqS oracle takes C ∈ Pk instead of an index j into c. In this case, we cannot check if U 2 = dh(Z i , C) by performing the test U 2 = Z cj i in the implementation of eqS for the simulator.
Game G hsk,nt 2,nkr . Instantiating with Naxos core yields:
For this game, we perform the reduction in three steps. The first reduction is to SCDH 2DDH for which we define the adversary C 2 . Then we use Lemma 2 to get rid of the 2DDH oracle and finally Theorem 2 to transform the SCDH adversary into a CDH adversary which yields the adversary B 2 . Before continuing, we rename SCDH 2DDH such that X becomes B, Y becomes Z, and Y becomes X. The CDH challenge is therefore B, X and Z is the vector of twins of B for which the 2DDH oracle can be used. We define the SCDH 2DDH adversary C 2 as follows. C 2 gets B, Z, X as input, samples c, calls B 2 with these values, and gets (i, Y,Â,B, S). To transform S into a set that contains dh(B, X) whenever B 2 wins, C 2 applies the function (U 1 U 2 U 3 Â B ) → U 2 . To (perfectly) simulate the orginal eqS , C 2 uses the implementation eqS (j, W, u,B,Ĉ, k) = (
Since the adversary can register arbitrary static public keys in the eCK kr model, the eqS oracle in the kr version of this game takes C ∈ Pk instead of an index u into c. In this case, we cannot check if U 2 = dh(Z j , C) by performing the test U 2 = Z cu j in the implementation of eqS for the simulator. We can directly perform a reduction to SCDH and then use Theorem 2 to obtain a reduction to CDH. For the reduction to SCDH, we use the function (U 1 U 2 U 3 D Ê ) → U 3 to transform S into a set that contains dh(X, Y ). This case directly generalizes to eCK kr since the third game is identical in this case.
eCK kr -security of Naxos and Naxos
In the previous proof, we have pointed out where the proof breaks down in the eCK kr model. We will now describe how to adapt the proof to (1) prove eCK kr -security of Naxos under the Gap-CDH assumption and (2) prove eCK kr -security of Naxos + under the CDH assumption.
For the proof with respect to Gap-CDH, we can deal with all the problematic cases by calling the DDH oracle with the right input, e.g., with DDH(Z i , C, U 2 ) for the first game. Note that there is no need for the twinning technique at all in this case and our generic proof can be instantiated in a very similar way to the original Naxos proof.
The Naxos + core protocol can be obtained from the Naxos core protocol by adding the additional group element dh(A, B) to the key. Concretely, we define
KeyI The additional group element is only required to simulate the eqS oracle. Everything else, in particular the case Game G hsk,nt 3
, can be trivially adapted.
Game G hsk,nt 1,kr . For Naxos + , we must simulate the following eqS oracle (we underline the differences to the Naxos version):
By using the 2DDH oracle for the group elements 1&3 and 2&4, we obtain the following implementation of eqS .
The simulation is perfect because the 2DDH calls returns 1 if and only if U 1 = dh(A, Y ) ∧ U 3 = dh(Z i , Y ) and U 4 = dh(A, C) ∧ U 2 = dh(Z i , C). Game G hsk,nt 2,kr . For Naxos + , we must simulate the following eqS oracle eqS (j, W, C,B,Ĉ, k) = return k = (dh(B, W ) dh(Z j , C) dh(Z j , W ) dh(B, C) B Ĉ )
By using the 2DDH oracle first for the group elements 1 and 3 and then using the oracle in a second call for the group elements 2 and 4, we obtain the following implementation of eqS .
The simulation is perfect because the first 2DDH calls returns 1 iff U 1 = dh(B, W )∧ U 3 = dh(Z j , W ) and the second call returns 1 iff U 4 = dh(B, C)∧U 2 = dh(Z j , C).
Proofs for Nets
The proofs for Nets are structured very similarly to the corresponding Naxos proofs and yield similar bounds. We therefore summarize the required changes in this section and refer to our EasyCrypt formalization for details. The proof that Nets is secure in our eCK nkr model with honestly generated keys under the CDH assumption is follows the corresponding proof for Naxos. The only significant difference is how the 2DDH oracle is used to simulate the eqS oracles in the first and second games. Whereas the Naxos protocol uses the concatenation of three group elements in the key, Nets uses the concatenation of two group elements U 1 U 2 where U 1 = dh(A, B) dh(A, Y ) dh(X, B) dh(X, Y ) and U 2 = cdh(X, Y ). Computing the right queries to 2DDH for simulating eqS requires divisions. Concretely, the first game uses 2DDH( U1 /A c j Z c j i U2, U 2 ) and the second game uses 2DDH( U1 /B c j Z c j i U2, U 2 ). To prove eCK kr -security under the Gap-CDH assumption, it is again possible to closely follow the original proof and use the DDH oracle to simulate eqS .
